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The budgetary costs of ageing in Europe 
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Change in gross public pension expenditure in EU27 
member states between 2010-2060 
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• The sustainability and adequacy of pensions are two sides of 
the same coin 
Assumptions and projections underlying the assessment of 
sustainability affect adequacy 
productivity growth, wages, employment, the link between wages 
and benefits 
Not all aspects of the adequacy of pensions are reflected by the 
replacement rate or the benefit rate 
(re)distributional impact, poverty, the link between wages and 
benefits 
• so…  
An assessment of the sustainability of pension systems should take 
into account the adequacy of pension benefits 
But what are we missing in this picture: financial 
and ‘social’ sustainability 
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1. Microsimulation: a birds-eye overview 
2. The dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS (Microsimulation for 
the Development of Adequacy and Sustainability) 
3. It takes two to tango: the relations between MIDAS and 
MALTESE 
4. An application: recent social security reform in  Belgium 
Budgetary impact of social security reform 
Social impact of social security reform 
5. Conclusions 
Overview of this presentation  
The social and budgetary impacts of recent social 
security reform in Belgium 
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A discussion and classification of microsimulation 
models 
 
• The essential function of (dynamic/static) microsimulation 
models... 
 
...is the imputation of (prospective/alternative) microdata 
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A classification of microsimulation models 
MIMOSIS 
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DYNACAN (Morrison, 2000), 
POLISIM (McKay, 2003),  
PENSIM2 (Emmerson, 2004),  
the Sfb3 models (Galler and Wagner, 1986),  
MOSART (Andreassen et al.et al., 1996),  
PENMOD (Shiraishi, 2008)  
SESIM (Ericson, and Hussenius, 1999; Klevmarken and Lindgren, 
2008) 
MIDAS_BE (Dekkers et al, 2010) 
 
 
 
Some dynamic cross-sectional ageing microsimulation 
models in governmental institutions 
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MIDAS - Microsimulation for the Development of 
Adequacy and Sustainability 
 
Starting dataset:  
Previously: PSBH survey sample 2002: ±8K individiduals 
Currently: « MIMOSIS 2001 » administrative sample, expanded: 
± 2.2K2 individuals 
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Mortality, fertility, education, 
‘marriage market’ 
Employment, public and private 
sector, civil servants,  
unemployment, 
disability, CELS, retirement 
Hours of work per month,  
months of work per year, 
earnings per hour 
1st pillar pension benefits 
- employees’ scheme 
- civil servants scheme 
- ind pendent workers’ scheme 
CELS ben fits 
disability pension ben fi s 
unemployment benefits 
welfare benefits 
8 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
TAXATION MODULE 
REDISTRIBUTION, 
POVERTY, INEQUALITY 
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Shall we dance? 
‘Channels of consistency’ of MIDAS with 
MALTESE 
 
1. State alignment 
2. Monetary alignment 
3. Joint social hypotheses 
MALTESE 
(macro) 
MIDAS 
(micro) 
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The microsimulation model MIDAS : ready to 
dance 
 
 Alignment of state variables:  
 Procedure to have the model respect or ‘mimic’ exogenous aggregates while 
respecting individual probabilities in the occurrence of the event 
– Behavioral equation determining the probability of the transition 
– Individuals are ranked depending on the obtained probability (from the highest to the 
lowest) 
– The number of selected individuals reproduces targeted aggregates 
 Monetary alignment or ‘amount alignment’: 
 Proportional adjustment of first-run values of earnings to match exogenous 
macroeconomic productivity growth rates 
 Uprating 
 Of social security benefits 
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Assumptions and hypotheses of the Study 
Committee on Ageing 
Key demographic hypotheses 2007 2030 2050 2060 
Fertility 1.81 1.76 1.76 1.77 
Life expectancy at birth 
Men 77.3 81.2 84.0 85.3 
women 83.3 87.0 89.7 90.9 
Key macro hypotheses Up to 2011 2011-2014 ≥ 2015 
Yearly productivity 0.01% 1.28% 1.50% 
Unemployment rate 14.75 in 2014 Decreasing towards 8% 
Social policy hypotheses 2009-2010 ≥ 2015 
Wage ceiling Current legislation 1.25% 
Minimum right per working year 1.25% 
Welfare adjustment non-lump-sum benefits  
Employed and self-employed 
0.50% 
Welfare adjustment of lump-sum benefits 1.00% 
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Commercial break: LIAM2 
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• Administrative data “MIMOSIS 2001” 
305.019 individuals.  
 random draw of 100.000 individuals whose main place of 
residence is in Belgium on January 1st, 2002 
 extend the sample with all those that live in the same private 
household as those included in the first draw 
sample of administrative data, taken from the Datawarehouse 
Labour Market and Social Protection 
 
Intermezzo: MIDAS’ starting dataset 
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• Advantages 
Considerably larger: representativeness, target groups 
Fewer missing values or nonresponse 
More credible retrospective information 
Gross earnings and incomes 
States are formally defined, and not self-assessed 
 
• Disadvantages 
Secondary data – not for research purposes 
Missing values are not random; far from it 
Missing variables: level of education 
 
Intermezzo: MIDAS’ starting dataset 
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• Missing level of education 
• Previous: use static microsimulation techniques  
We know whether a (working) individual is a BCW or WCW. 
We know the educational attainment levels of BCW and WCW on 
the basis of the Labour Force Survey. 
Use a Monte-Carlo process to simulate level of education given 
gender and employment status. 
• Latest version: use statistical multiple imputation techniques 
to impute data on educational attainment level from the EU-
SILC 
1. Specify and estimate a multinominal logit of education 
attainment level on explanatory variables that are common in 
both datasets 
2. Replace each missing observation by m>1 values from a Monte 
Carlo simulation process 
3. Select randomly one imputed observation during the expansion 
process 
Intermezzo: MIDAS’ starting dataset 
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• Belgium is ageing 
• We (also) experience the economic crisis, resulting in a 
slowdown of GDP and the contribution base 
Budgetary costs of ageing without reform would increase by 4.7% 
of GDP between 2011 and 2060 
• Employment rate of older workers remains low in 
international perspective 
• After a period of political stalemate, the Di Rupo 
administration introduced a number of measures in the law 
of December 28th, 2011 
Reduce the costs of the system by delaying early retirement 
Increase the activity rate of older workers 
• What are the consequences of this reform on the poverty risk 
among the elderly? 
An application: An assessment of recent social 
security reform in Belgium 
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• Conditions for early retirement:  
Age condition gradually increases from 60 to 62 in 2016 
Minimum career length immediately increases from 35 to 38 years, and 
then gradually to 40 years in 2015 
Most civil servants now become subject to the same conditions as 
employees 
• Adaptation of the rules for calculating the benefit 
Equivalent periods unemployed/UCA are now evaluated by the minimum 
right per career year 
The early-retirement penalty for self-employed is reduced and abandoned 
for those of 63 and older, or who have a long career. 
Regimes for specific civil servants (university professors!) are abandoned 
The pension benefit of all civil servants younger than 50 (1/1/2012) is now 
based on the last 10 years of the career 
Possibilities for ‘equivalent periods’ are extended for civil servants of 50 
and older 
An overall cap of 5 years is introduced for equivalent periods (except for 
‘thematic career breaks’) 
 
 
An application: Social Security Reform in Belgium 
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• Unemployment 
Cohabiting with dependants, singles: 3rd period unemployment 
introduced after 3 years; benefit is a minimum 
Cohabiting:  2nd period becomes shorter 
Benefit increases from 60 to 65 of last earnings during the 1st 
period 
Benefit is decreasing over time during the 2nd period 
Age condition for seniority supplement: was 50 years of age and 
career of 20 years; now 55 years of age 
 
• Conventional Early Leavers’ Scheme (CELS) 
Replaced by Unemployment with Company Allowance (UCA) 
Entry conditions restricted (minimum age from 58 to 60; career 
condition from 35 to 40 years) 
Part-time CELS abandoned 
 
 
Unemployment/Conventional Early Leavers’ scheme 
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Macroeconomics and labour market 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2030 2060 
Participation rate (labour forcea in % of population 15-64 
years) 
72.7 74.2 74.5 1.0 1.0 
15-54 years 76.5 75.6 75.6 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 52.9 64.0 64.9 5.8 6.2 
Employment rate (total employment in % of population 15-64 
years) 
64.0 68.0 68.5 0.9 1.0 
15-54 years 68.3 70.0 70.2 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 42.0 55.1 56.3 5.2 5.6 
Unemployment rate (unemployment in % of labour forcea) 11.9 8.5 8.0 0.1 0.0 
CELS/UCA rate (% of potential labour forceb 50-64 years) 8.0 5.9 5.6 -1.5 -1.5 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of the reforms 
Average annual growth rates in real terms in % Level in % 
2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2030 2060 
GDP 1.6 1.7 1.7 O.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Productivity 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Employment 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Table 2 Labour market: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform in percentage point) 
Table 3 Macroeconomic projection: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform in % 
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Table 4 Budgetary costs of ageing: base scenario of the Study Committee of Ageing (with reform) and impact of the reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform), October 2012 
% of GDP 
The impact of social security reform 
 
Budgetary costs 
Components of the budgetary 
costs 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2011-
2060 
Pensions 9.9 13.6 14.5 4.6 -0.2 -0.1 
- wage-earners 5.4 7.6 7.8 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 
- self-employed 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
- civil servants 3.7 5.0 5.6 1.8 -0.1 0.1 
Health Carea 8.0 9.4 11.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Disability schemes 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Unemploymentb 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 
CELS/UCA 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Children benefits 1.6 1.6 1.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other social expenditures 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total 25.3 29.5 31.4 6.1 -0.5 -0.3 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee of Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. Public expenditure, inclusive long-term care. 
b. Inclusive time credit and career breaks  
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• CELS/UCA (-0.1%): reduction of beneficiaries 
 
• Unemployment (-0.1%; especially in the long term): less 
career breaks, more importantly: lower benefits due to  
-Decrease of unemployment benefit with duration unemployment 
-Increased eligibility age for seniority supplement 
 
• Pension (-0.2% middle term, -0.1% long term).  
-In the middle term the number of pensioners decreases 
-In the long term, these individuals will eventually retire and 
receive a higher pension benefit. In the systems of employees and 
self-employed, these effects cancel each other out, but in the 
civil servants’ scheme, costs will in the long run increase. 
 
The impact of social security reform 
 
Budgetary costs 
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Social impact 
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Male - with reform Female - with reform Male - without reform Female - without reform 
Risk of poverty rate of retirees by gender, in percent  
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Social impact of pension reform 
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Social impact of unemployment reform 
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Conclusions 
1. This paper assesses the sustainability and adequacy impact of 
recent social security reform in Belgium 
2. As a result of this reform, the budgetary costs of ageing are 
reduced by 0.3%-point GDP, evenly distributed between 
pensions, unemployment and CELS/UCA. 
3. In amounts, the costs are reduced as well, but the picture is less 
clear-cut. 
4. So the impact of the reform is mainly via the higher employment 
rate and the resulting higher GDP growth rate. 
5. The risk of poverty of pensioners decreases as a result of the 
reform. This effect is faster for men than for women 
6. The poverty risk for (male!) unemployed increases considerably 
7. The reform thus reinforces the existing AROP profiles 
between the unemployed and retired 
8. Interested in microsimulation? You really ought to try LIAM2! 
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• Dekkers, et al., 2010, The flip side of the coin: the consequences of the European 
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of Social Security, 12(2), June 2010, pp. 94-120. 
• Dekkers, Inagaki and Desmet, 2012, Dynamic Microsimulation Modeling for Policy 
Support: An Application to Belgium and Possibilities for Japan. Review of 
Socionetwork Strategies, 6(2), pp 31-47. 
• Simulation of reforms through MALTESE and MIDAS 
• Dekkers , Desmet, Fasquelle, Weemaes, 2013, The social and budgetary impacts of 
recent social security reform in Belgium. Paper presented at the IMPALLA-ESPANET 
International Conference “Building blocks for an inclusive society: empirical evidence 
from social policy research, Luxembourg, April 18 & 19, 2013 
• Imputation 
• Dekkers, Desmet, 2011, Dynamic Microsimulation of administrative data using LIAM 
2: Some preliminary results. Final Report PROGRESS project SIPEBE, November 2011 
• Dekkers, 2013, The imputation of the level of education, nationality and country 
of birth in the “MIMOSIS 2001” dataset using the SILC. Deliverable project MIMBEL, 
January 2013. 
 
 
 
 
Finally, some literature available upon request 
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Alignment versus ‘normal’ simulation 
State 1 
State 2 
Individual i 
Ui < Pi 
Pi=logit-
1(βX) 
Ui < 1-Pi 
‘standard’ Monte Carlo simulation Aligned simulation target x% 
State 1 
State 2 
Rank 1...n 
First xN individual 
Ranki=logit-
1(βX+εi) 
Other (100-x)N individuals 
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Monetary alignment 
1. Simulate the model 
yi=βXi + ui  (2001, t) 
2. aggregate; 
calculate gY 
3. Compare gY and 
gX and calculate the 
correction for t 
 ct  = gX / gY  
4. Proportionally adapt 
individual earnings 
 
ctyi=(βXi + ui) x ct 
 
Monetary alignment target growth rate gxt 
